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1 For surveys of corporate gover-
nance that focus on or include
the United States, see Jensen
(1993) or Shleifer and Vishny
(1997).
2 See Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) and the references
therein for more information on
the Japanese system of corpo-
rate governance. 













assure investors in corporations that
they will receive adequate returns on
their investments (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, p. 737).  If these mechanisms did
not exist or did not function properly, out-
side investors would not lend to ﬁrms or
buy equity in them.  Businesses would be
forced to rely entirely on their own inter-
nally generated cash ﬂows and accumulat-
ed ﬁnancial resources to ﬁnance ongoing
operations as well as proﬁtable investment
opportunities.  Overall economic perfor-
mance would suffer because many good
business opportunities would be missed
and temporary ﬁnancial problems at indi-
vidual ﬁrms would spread quickly to
employees, consumers, and other ﬁrms.
Despite their universal importance and
a considerable international exchange of
ideas and institutions, corporate governance
systems differ, even among advanced
market economies.  Useful generalizations
can be drawn, however, and researchers
commonly differentiate between two leading
corporate governance systems (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, p. 737):  (1) the “Anglo-
Saxon” model found in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and other English-
speaking countries, and (2) the “German-
Japanese” model found in the two countries
named and, to varying degrees, in other
countries that share historical or economic
traditions with them. Two important
dimensions along which these leading cor-
porate governance systems differ are the
role of ﬁnancial markets and the inﬂuence
of workers on corporate decision making. 
Financial markets are important
sources of corporate ﬁnance and corporate
governance in countries operating under
the Anglo-Saxon model.  Public and pri-
vate markets for debt and equity securities
issued by corporations outstrip the amount
of ﬁnancing provided directly by ﬁnancial
intermediaries by a wide margin.  Many
ﬁrms change hands each year on the stock
market, some without the consent of
incumbent management (i.e., via hostile
takeovers).  Meanwhile, employees’ inﬂu-
ence on matters of corporate governance is
very diffused, exercised primarily through
union representation and a limited amount
of equity ownership in pension or personal
savings plans.  Firms in which non-execu-
tive workers play a meaningful role in cor-
porate decision making are the exception
rather than the rule in these economies.1
Capital allocation and corporate gov-
ernance practices in countries operating
under the German-Japanese model differ
substantially from practices in the Anglo-
Saxon model.  This article focuses on the
German system in particular, in which
universal banks are the primary source of
corporate ﬁnance to ﬁrms of all sizes.2
These banks lend directly to ﬁrms, take
equity stakes under certain circumstances,
and provide underwriting services to ﬁrms
issuing debt or equity securities to the
public market.  Corporate debt and equity
markets remain very small in relation to
the size of the German economy.  Corpo-
rate governance is dominated by universal
banks and by nonbank block shareholders.
Control changes (i.e., changes of manage-
ment teams) tend to be arranged behind
closed doors, often by the banks or other
blockholders, rather than being carried out
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3 Market makers were phased
out on the ﬁrst segment
(Amtlicher Handel) of the
Frankfurt stock exchange, the
largest in Germany, between
November 1997 and late
1998.  This change occurred
because a new electronic trad-
ing system, known as Xetra
(Exchange Electronic Trading),
handles all ﬁrst-segment trading
(Die Welt, Nov. 25, Nov. 28,
Nov. 29, 1997).
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through a stock-market takeover.  In stark
contrast to the United States and other
countries operating under the Anglo-Saxon
model, there have been only a handful 
of hostile takeovers in Germany since
World War II.
The other notable feature of the
German system highlighted in this article is
employees’ signiﬁcant direct inﬂuence on
strategic corporate decision making.  This
role in corporate governance extends far
beyond that conferred by union representa-
tion and employee stock ownership, the
main channels of employee inﬂuence in the
Anglo-Saxon model.
Theoretical analyses of the relative
merits of the U.S. and German ﬁnancial
and corporate governance systems have
begun to appear only recently; for example,
see Hellwig (1991), Allen and Gale (1995),
or Dietl (1998).  We attempt to answer a
much narrower set of questions in this
article:  What control mechanisms are pre-
sent in Germany that do not operate in the
U.S.?  Why do the corporate governance
systems of these two economically advanced
countries differ so much?  What empirical
research has been done on the effects of
control mechanisms on the performance of
firms?  Our hope is that by answering these
questions we will help lay the groundwork
for tackling the much more difﬁcult ques-
tions related to welfare comparisons of dif-
ferent ﬁnancial systems. 
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY
The two most distinctive institutional
features of corporate governance in Ger-
many may be the extensive role of big uni-
versal banks and the strong inﬂuence of
workers on corporate decision making.
First, universal banks lend to ﬁrms, under-
write shares, hold equity positions, act as
market makers at the stock exchange,3 sit
on corporate boards, and exercise proxy
votes for shares owned by others.  Second,
workers have a strong voice in corporate
affairs, institutionalized by laws concerning
Mitbestimmung, or codetermination.  These
laws guarantee workers a certain number
of seats on corporate boards.  In particular,
every large German corporation must
reserve 50 percent of the seats on its super-
visory board (board of directors) for
employee representatives.  In a few cases,
employee representatives also hold seats
on a stock corporation’s management
board (committee of the top executives).
The shaded insert on the next page
describes the three forms of codetermina-
tion in Germany.
Universal banking and codetermi-
nation have common origins.  Both are
state or quasi-state institutional means of
coordinating individual activities and
achieving social consensus.  Although
both universal banking and codetermina-
tion have profound implications for the
allocation of private control and property
rights, only codetermination derives its
legitimacy and concrete form from statute.
The case of universal banks is more subtle.
The major universal banks are privately
owned, but they are sometimes described
as quasi-state institutions.  First, they are
exempted from some forms of market dis-
cipline.  In particular, they are widely per-
ceived to be both “too big to fail” and “too
important to be taken over” except with
government approval (this special status of
large banks is not unique to Germany, of
course).  Second, universal banks are
expected (and commonly perceived) to act
in the public and/or national interest
rather than seeking strictly to maximize
proﬁts.  In the words of an earlier British
observer, “What the great public and semi-
public institutions are to the French
economy, the big banks are to Germany”
(Shonﬁeld, 1965, p. 247).
A recent corporate control contest in
Germany brought into sharp relief just
how different the German and Anglo-
Saxon models of corporate governance —
and public sensitivities about these differ-
ences — really are.  During the spring of
1997, Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp
(“Krupp”), one of Germany’s largest steel
and engineering companies, launched a
hostile takeover bid for Thyssen AG
(“Thyssen”), its main competitor.  The




There are two major corporate forms
in Germany: the Aktiengesellschaft (stock
corporation), abbreviated AG, and the
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (lim-
ited-liability corporation), abbreviated
GmbH.  Both types of corporation have
limited liability, but a GmbH cannot be
listed on a stock exchange.  They are gov-
erned by a two-tier board system, com-
prising the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)
and the management board (Vorstand).
Codetermination laws apply to all 
corporations in Germany with at least 500
employees.  Codetermination rules cover
the supervisory board, the functions of
which are to control and monitor the man-
agement, to appoint and dismiss members
of the management board, to ﬁx their
salaries, and to approve major decisions 
of the management board.
Although elements of codetermina-
tion were present in pre-war Germany,
four laws have been passed in the post-
World War II period re-introducing code-
termination.  First, Montanmitbestimmung
(codetermination in the coal and steel
industry) was introduced in 1951.  This
law, which remains the most far-reaching
of all codetermination laws, mandated
equal representation of employees and
shareholders on the supervisory boards of
ﬁrms operating in the coal and steel
industry.  Among other provisions, it
speciﬁed that board members must elect a
so-called neutral board member to break
ties.  This person is typically a prominent
political or cultural ﬁgure.  In addition,
one member of the management board
must represent workers’ interests
(Arbeitsdirektor).  This person cannot be
appointed over the objections of a majori-
ty of the employee representatives on the 
supervisory board.
The second important law concerning
codetermination was the Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz (Workplace Governance
Act) of 1952.  This act extended codeter-
mination to all companies with limited
liability.  It did not replace Montan-
codetermination but, instead, modiﬁed it
for application to other ﬁrms.  One-third
of the supervisory board seats in these
enterprises were reserved for representa-
tives of employees.  Exceptions were
granted for organizations with political,
religious, media, or other character for
which freedom of speech is central to their
mission.  In addition, stock corporations
with fewer than 500 employees that are
owned by a family are also exempted.
Third, Montan-codetermination was
extended to include more speciﬁc rules
and procedures in 1956.  This form of
codetermination remains the most intru-
sive in terms of how it affects the corpo-
rate governance of the ﬁrm.  Only 10
companies remained subject to Montan-
codetermination in 1997, compared to 
49 in the 1960s.
Finally, under the Codetermination
Act of 1976, any corporation that has
more than 2,000 employees (and was not
already covered by Montan-codetermina-
tion) must allow employees to elect one-
half of the members of the supervisory
board.  This law preempts the 1952 law.
Total board size is either 16, 18, or 20
members.  At least one supervisory board
member is a representative of the middle
management (leitende Angestellte).  If the
supervisory board has 16 or 18 members,
two of the worker representatives have to
be labor union representatives.  If the
board consists of 20 members, there are
three union representatives.  The supervi-
sory board chairman is effectively elected
by the shareholders’ representatives and is
given an extra vote to break ties, so there
is no need for a neutral member.
The laws governing stock corpora-
tions allow individual companies some
leeway to determine which decisions must
be approved by the supervisory board.
However, some types of decisions must be
ratiﬁed by the supervisory board.  Thus,
workers are guaranteed a signiﬁcant voice
in the process of corporate decision mak-
ing in Germany.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort Benson,
the London-based investment bank sub-
sidiaries of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank, respectively (two of the three large
private universal banks).  The soon-to-be
CEO of Deutsche Bank, Rolf Breuer, pub-
licly likened this takeover battle to a test of
whether Anglo-Saxon-style takeovers are
feasible in Germany.
The public reaction was swift and
unambiguously negative.  Strikes and
demonstrations of furious Thyssen
workers followed the announcement of the
bid.  The conservative German chancellor,
Helmut Kohl, expressed his “deep concern”
over the matter and asked the parties to
“live up to their social responsibilities.”
Public outrage culminated in a demonstra-
tion outside Deutsche Bank headquarters
in Frankfurt, the largest bank in Germany
and ﬁnancial advisor to Krupp.
Bank leaders expressed frustration
with what they called inconsistent public
criticism.  For years, the big German
banks had been taken to task for
hampering the development of capital
markets that would function along the
lines of British or American markets.  Yet
now, when they attempted to use German
ﬁnancial markets for one of its best-suited
purposes—effecting a change in the own-
ership structure and the management
team—they faced renewed criticism.  If
Germany is to have well-developed Anglo-
Saxon-style capital markets, they argued,
all parties must accept the proposition that
a principal outcome of stock-market
trading is to allow involuntary control
changes.  This mechanism enhances ﬁrm
efﬁciency and is one of the most important
contributions stock markets can make to
overall economic efﬁciency (Manne, 1965).
The shaded insert on the next page provides
further details on this takeover battle.
CULTURAL TRADITIONS:
THE CONSENSUS MODEL
To understand the important institu-
tional features of corporate governance in
Germany, and to appreciate how different
they are from the Anglo-Saxon tradition,
we must take a look back into the intellec-
tual histories of Germany and the United
Kingdom.  While there are certainly simi-
larities among all versions of capitalism, it
appears reasonable to speak of a distinctive
continental European model of capitalism
stressing social consensus.  It differs from
the Anglo-Saxon model most fundamen-
tally with regard to the role of the state in
the economy and the social safety net.
And, as we have noted, workers’ rights
could be added to this list of differences.
In Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam
Smith (1723-90) argued in favor of a society
based on individual decision making which,
coordinated by the invisible hand, would
ensure the social optimum.  Smith saw little
need for central government planning:
The sovereign is completely discharged
from a duty, in the attempting to perform
which he must always be exposed to innu-
merable delusions, and for the proper per-
formance of which no human wisdom or
knowledge could ever be sufﬁcient; the
duty of superintending the industry of pri-
vate people, and of directing it towards the
employments most suitable to the interest
of the society. (Book 4, Chapter 9).
Although his writings circulated in
Germany, Smith’s world view never
became as inﬂuential there as in the
Anglo-Saxon countries.  Instead, Germans
(as well as most other continental Euro-
peans) have been inﬂuenced more strongly
by the German philosopher, G.F .W. Hegel
(1770-1831) and his most well-known fol-
lower, Karl Marx (1818-83).
In Philosophy of Right (1821), Hegel
agreed with Smith that markets turn “sub-
jective selﬁshness into a contribution
towards the satisfaction of the need of
everyone else.”  In contrast to Smith, how-
ever, Hegel was pessimistic about some
aspects of the outcome of unfettered
market operations.  Hegel predicted that
unrestrained market exchanges would
produce a class caught in a spiral of
poverty.  Hegel called for a system of social
contracts that would complement individ-
uals’ market transactions by collective bar-
gaining arrangements and elements of
central planning.  As the provider of suchFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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At the beginning of 1997, Fried. Krupp
AG Hoesch-Krupp (“Krupp”) and Thyssen
AG (“Thyssen”) were two of the largest
German steel and engineering companies.
Krupp was somewhat smaller than Thyssen,
with total assets of DM 17.8 bn (end-of-
ﬁscal year 1996) versus DM 25.5 bn for
Thyssen (end-of-ﬁscal year 1995/96).  
In terms of European industry rankings,
Thyssen was the 149
th largest ﬁrm in
Europe and Krupp ranked as number 
273 (Financial Times, 1998).
The two ﬁrms had always been similar
in some respects.  Since World War II,
both companies had acquired many other
German steel makers to expand their
steel-making capacity.  Both ﬁrms had
transformed their steel divisions into sub-
sidiaries (Krupp Stahl and Thyssen Stahl)
to facilitate diversiﬁcation by the parent
company.  Finally, both ﬁrms had focused
their recent acquisitions on engineering.
In 1991, CEO Gerhard Cromme
announced Krupp’s desire to enter into a
close alliance with Hoesch AG.  Krupp
backed up Cromme’s ambition by acquir-
ing a 24.9 percent equity stake in Hoesch.
This position had been built up in the
course of the year with the help of a Swiss
bank.  It had remained unnoticed until
Cromme’s announcement because the
threshold for mandatory public disclosure
of block holdings in Germany was 25 per-
cent at that time (it was changed to 5 per-
cent in 1995; it is also 5 percent in the
United States).  Deutsche Bank had
installed Kajo Neukirchen as CEO of
Hoesch just a few months earlier and 
was caught by surprise when Krupp
announced its intentions.  Despite a 
15 percent voting restriction (ceiling)
imposed on any shareholder by Hoesch’s
corporate bylaws, Krupp overcame vigor-
ous resistance by Neukirchen and merged
with Hoesch in 1992.
For several years in the early 1990s,
Gerhard Cromme had tried to ﬁnd a way
to merge Krupp and Thyssen.  However,
Cromme was never able to make any
headway with Thyssen’s CEO, Dieter
Vogel.  In the end, Krupp enlisted
Deutsche Bank for a takeover attempt.
The takeover strategy itself was developed
by Goldman Sachs of the United States
and bore the telling code name “Hammer
und Thor.”  Financing was arranged by
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort
Benson, London-based investment bank
subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank, respectively.
On March 17, 1997, rumors spread
that Krupp would launch a takeover
attack on  Thyssen.  The next day, Krupp
made its intentions public, announcing a
tender offer for Thyssen.  Krupp and
Thyssen shares were suspended from
stock exchange trading as details were
communicated to the market.  Thyssen
made clear that it did not welcome the bid
and considered the takeover attempt hos-
tile.  Infuriated Thyssen workers demon-
strated in front of the Krupp headquarters.
In response to public outrage and
strikes at Thyssen’s steel subsidiary, the
state government of North Rhine-Westfalia,
home of both companies, offered to act as
a mediator. The state prime minister met
with the CEOs of both companies on
March 18.  He convinced them to consider
a merger of the steel subsidiaries alone,
rather than of the entire enterprises.  In
deference to these talks, Krupp suspended
its takeover bid for a week.  On March 24,
Krupp and its banks withdrew the bid.
Negotiations over a merger of the steel
subsidiaries continued.
At the end of March, Krupp and
Thyssen announced the merger of their
steel subsidiaries into Thyssen Krupp
Stahl AG, to become effective April 1.
This company is now the largest 
steel maker in Europe and the third-
largest in the world.
In August of 1997, the public learned
that there had been more conﬁdential talks
about a complete merger of Krupp and
Thyssen.  In mid-September, the surprising
results of  these talks emerged.  The 
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a framework, the State should be a means
toward the manifestation of the “common
will.”  The principle underlying all of the
institutions envisioned by Hegel—and
rejected by Smith—is that the market
should be guided and controlled to ensure
that every individual is treated fairly in his
or her transactions with “society as a whole.”
Building on Hegel’s distrust of the market,
Marx proposed reorganizing society to do
away with markets altogether. 
Hegel’s ideas continue to inﬂuence
thinking in Germany to this day (although
Marxian radicalism is clearly in eclipse).
The Hegelian concept of a market economy
with a social component is enshrined in
the modern German constitution, which
proclaims that the Federal Republic is to
be a Soziale Marktwirtschaft, or “social
market economy.”  Market mechanisms are
often viewed with suspicion in Germany,
their results being regarded as chaotic,
risky, and unfair.  As a result, numerous
social contracts, such as the state-run, 
pay-as-you-go pension system, generous
unemployment and disability insurance,
and collective industry-wide wage agree-
ments, substitute for or complement
market outcomes.  These social contracts
coordinate individual activities toward the
“common will” and reduce individuals’
idiosyncratic risks.
Hegel’s inﬂuence extends to contempo-
rary business practices in Germany.  Writing
in a survey of corporate control in Germany,
Ellen Schneider-Lenné (1992)—who, until
her early death in 1996, was a member of
the management board of Deutsche Bank—
describes the appropriate objectives of a
German ﬁrm such as Deutsche Bank: 
management boards of both ﬁrms had
agreed to a complete merger.  The pro-
posed merger received the approval of 
the supervisory boards of Thyssen (on
January 22, 1998) and of Krupp (on
February 5, 1998) with thin majorities.
Sorting out the details of this merger
will not be simple.  Thyssen was subject
to Montan-codetermination rules (i.e.,
speciﬁc to the coal and steel industries
and more favorable to union representa-
tives), while Krupp was subject to the reg-
ular form of equal representation (with a
lesser role for trade unions).  All 10 work-
er representatives on the Thyssen supervi-
sory board voted against the merger, and
the so-called “neutral member” of the
board broke the tie in favor of merging.
On the Krupp supervisory board, the rep-
resentative of middle management voted
in favor of the merger.  Otherwise, the
vote would have been deadlocked and the
chairman would have been forced to use
his second vote to break the tie.  The new
ﬁrm, Thyssen-Krupp AG, is not subject to
Montan-codetermination and its strong
trade-union inﬂuence.  This may be one of
the reasons why Thyssen’s unionized
workers resisted the merger so strongly.
The roles played by Deutsche Bank
and Dresdner Bank in this takeover battle
remain controversial in Germany.  When
Krupp launched its takeover attempt with
the backing of the banks, Wolfgang Röller,
the ex-CEO of Dresdner Bank and current
chairman of its supervisory board, was a
member of Thyssen’s supervisory board.
When his board term ended at the end of
March 1997, he was succeeded by
Bernhard Walter, a member of the
Dresdner Bank management board (and
now its CEO).  Even more delicate was the
case of Ulrich Cartellieri, a member of the
management board of Deutsche Bank and
simultaneously a member of the Thyssen
supervisory board.  As a member of
Thyssen’s supervisory board, he had access
to inside information that would have
been valuable to Krupp, Deutsche Bank’s
client.  As a member of the Deutsche Bank
management board, he approved the
takeover attempt.  Haunted by sharp pub-
lic criticism, Cartellieri retired from both
positions on May 20, 1997.
SOURCE:  Various issues of “Die
Welt,” German Daily, <http://
www.welt.de>; Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (March 18, 1998).FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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The objectives of German companies,
however, do not stop at maximization of
the return on investment.  Their philosophy
is based on ‘the concept of the interest of
the company as a whole,’ a key concept of
German corporate culture.
The company is seen as a combination
of various groups whose goals have to be
coordinated.  The company’s prime objec-
tive is doubtless to secure the survival over
the long term. Alongside this, however, the
long-term interests of its employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, and the general public
have also to be taken into consideration.
The creation and maintenance of jobs with
attractive working conditions has special
priority.  There is also a growing sense of
responsibility towards the environment.  In
Germany the enterprise is considered to be
embedded in society, and since it proﬁts
from society it also has obligations towards
it.  This commitment is rooted in the
German constitution which says that own-
ership entails obligations.
The widely varying conﬂicts of interest
that can arise between individual groups
within the company and outside are usu-
ally resolved by compromise.  One might,




CORPORATE CONTROL  
SYSTEMS IN GERMANY
This section provides an overview of
the institutional framework within which
internal and external control mechanisms
are exercised in Germany.  Internal control
mechanisms include a ﬁrm’s bylaws and
the powers exercised by shareholders at
the annual meeting, as well as the two-tier
board system that is designed to guide the
ﬁrm on a daily basis and to provide an
early-warning system when problems and
threats arise.  External control mechanisms
include product-market competition,
political, legal, and regulatory controls,
and the capital markets, primarily the
stock market.  Large-block shareholders
and universal banks are the two most
prominent stakeholder groups that effec-
tively span the internal and external con-
trol environments.  The next section of
this article examines how these key stake-
holders perform their corporate
governance functions.
Internal Control Systems: 
Annual Shareholder Meetings
The most basic internal control mech-
anism of any publicly traded ﬁrm is the
annual shareholder meeting.  This is the
only occasion on which the management
team is obliged to listen to shareholders’
views and to answer their questions.  How-
ever, very few small shareholders vote at
annual meetings, calling into question the
ability of this control mechanism to pro-
vide appropriate governance of corporate
decisions.  Table 1 shows that shareholder
representation at annual meetings of large
ﬁrms with dispersed ownership is low and
declining.  For example, the fraction of
outstanding shares actually voted at the
1994 annual meeting of Schering, a phar-
maceutical company without a large block-
holder, was a mere 36.7 percent.
The most important outcome of the
annual shareholder meeting is the election
of supervisory board members, who func-
tion as the shareholders’ representatives
Votes Cast at Annual Shareholder Meetings
as a Percentage of Shares Outstanding  
Company  1975  1980  1986  1990  1994
BASF  65.9  66.2  55.4  52.4  50.9
Bayer  64.9  67.5  52.9  47.2  48.4
Continental  72.9  65.0  35.1  58.7  47.3
Daimler-Benz  93.0  89.7  80.4  78.6  70.8
Hoechst  69.6  66.7  58.3  66.9  71.5
Mannesmann  65.1  63.4  49.6  37.0  45.7
Schering  47.1  58.0  46.6  33.7  36.7
Siemens  72.1  72.1  58.2  49.5  53.9
Thyssen  84.0  79.0  68.5  64.8  68.3
VEBA  80.9  78.3  65.2  51.1  46.2
Volkswagen  58.6  59.9  50.1  34.7  32.9
SOURCE: Bundesverband deutscher Banken <http://www.bdb.de>.
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throughout the rest of the year.  Other
important issues considered at this time
include the possibility of offering new
shares for sale as well as what fraction of
the year’s proﬁt to retain and what fraction
to pay out as dividends.
Shareholders in Germany who do not
plan to attend the annual meeting are
allowed to transfer their voting rights to
someone else, either a person or an institu-
tion.  Small shareholders and blockholders
alike make use of this right to designate a
proxy (a “stand-in”) to vote their shares.
Blocks held by individuals are frequently
voted by bank executive directors or other
trusted individuals.  Also, some blocks
owned by foreign governments are voted
regularly by German banks.  Most small
shareholders who bother to vote designate
either a bank or a shareholder association
(an organization pledging to safeguard
small shareholders’ interests) to be 
their proxy.
Legally, shareholders may transfer
their voting rights to any person or institu-
tion.  Universal banks have a competitive
advantage over other parties in obtaining
proxy voting powers, however, because
universal banks provide the vast majority
of retail brokerage services in Germany,
and most equity shares are in bearer form
(i.e., anonymous as opposed to being reg-
istered with the company issuing them, as
in the United States).  Shareholders typi-
cally need custodial services to safeguard
their shares, and custody is a basic banking
business.  It is a small step in the minds of
most retail shareholders to transfer their
voting rights to the bank that holds their
shares.  The banks also have an informa-
tional advantage by knowing who owns
the shares.
Authority for bank-proxy voting must
be granted by shareholders in writing and
must be renewed at least once every 15
months.  Shareholders may revoke their
prior authorization at any time, in writing.
The bank must mail the upcoming agenda
to shareholders in advance of the annual
meeting, indicating how the votes will be
cast unless otherwise instructed by the
shares’ owner.  Unless a shareholder
replies with explicit voting instructions,
the bank votes the shares as it previously
indicated it would.4 In the experience of
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank
during 1973, only 350 out of 300,000 
(0.1 percent) of the shareholders who used
bank-proxy voting gave the bank alternate
instructions (Die Aktiengesellschaft, 
Nr. 2 / 1974, p. 59).
Proxy voting by banks was criticized
severely by a government antitrust com-
mission when it examined competition in
the German economy (Monopolkommission,
1978).  The commission determined that,
at the 1975 annual meetings of 56 of the
100 largest stock corporations, banks 
exercised at least 5 percent of the votes
(Monopolkommission, 1978).  About 50
percent of these votes were proxy votes.  
In 30 of the meetings, banks cast more than
50 percent of the votes, comprising their
own shares and the proxy votes they exer-
cised; in 11 cases, they cast between 25
percent and 50 percent of the votes; and in
15 cases, between 5 percent and 25 percent
of the votes.  Similarly, Böhm (1992) con-
ﬁrms that banks (primarily the three
largest private universal banks, Deutsche,
Dresdner, and Commerzbank) dominated
many shareholder meetings in 1986.
Voting patterns at the annual meetings
of the banks themselves epitomize the
danger that proxy voting may create disen-
franchised shareholders.  Analyzing data
from 1986 shareholder meetings, Gottschalk
(1988) reports that if the three large uni-
versal banks had voted together as a block—
including both their own shares and the
shares they voted in proxy—they would
have commanded a majority of the votes at
each bank’s annual meeting.  This was true
despite the fact that none of the banks
itself owned more than a trivial amount of
shares in either of the other two. It should
also be noted that the banks do not actively
compete for proxy votes; these are merely a
byproduct of their large branch and retail
brokerage networks.
A proposed change in legislation
(pending at the time this article was written)
would restrict banks’ use of proxy votes 
to ﬁrms in which the banks hold at least 
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tion arrives between the contact
with the shareholders and the
annual meeting.  The legal rules
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5 percent of the voting stock.  This rule
would discriminate against banks as custo-
dians for small shareholders.5 Small share-
holders would then either let their votes go
unexercised, travel to the annual meeting,
or transfer their voting rights to other
agents such as the Deutsche  Schutzvereini-
gung für Wertpapierbesitz e.V., an organiza-
tion dedicated to protecting small
shareholders’ rights <http://www.
das-wertpapier.de/dsw/index.htm>.
Internal Control Systems: 
The Two-Tier Board System
German stock corporations operate
with a two-tier board system, in contrast to
the single board speciﬁed in the corporate
law of Anglo-Saxon countries.  The Aufsicht-
srat, or supervisory board (board of direc-
tors), consists of shareholder representatives
and worker representatives in ﬁxed propor-
tions.  Its members are non-executive direc-
tors (in contrast to U.S. practice, in which
executives often dominate the board of
directors), although the chairman is often a
former CEO.  The supervisory board typi-
cally meets two to four times a year to
oversee the second-tier Vorstand, or manage-
ment board, a committee composed of the
ﬁrm’s top executives.
Shareholder representatives on the
supervisory board are normally elected at
the annual meeting for a maximum term
of ﬁve years.  In some cases, however,
blockholders have the right to appoint
supervisory board members directly.  
Reappointments are permissible for both
supervisory and management boards.
German supervisory boards are inﬂu-
enced strongly by worker representatives
(employees and labor union executives),
who are guaranteed seats by codetermina-
tion laws.  Table 2 illustrates the board com-
position of the 100 largest ﬁrms in Germany.
The number of board seats held by private
banks has been declining in recent years,
partly in response to public criticism of
“excessive accumulation of power” by banks
through board representation in excess of
their direct ownership of stock.  It should be
noted, however, that bankers are often nom-
inated to serve on supervisory boards by the
ﬁrms themselves.
The chairman of the management
board functions as the ﬁrm’s CEO.  The
supervisory board appoints the members
of the management board for a term of up
to ﬁve years.  Major decisions of the man-
agement board typically require the super-
visory board’s approval.
External Control Systems: 
The Legal Environment
No corporate governance system can
function without legal protections of
investors’ property rights.  More speciﬁ-
cally, the rights to own and dispose of
equity shares in a ﬁrm and to vote on cor-
porate matters that may affect the value of
an owner’s investment are fundamental to
a well-functioning capitalist economy.
Several aspects of the legal environment
in Germany are inimical to shareholders’
rights, reducing the effectiveness of external
control mechanisms such as the stock
5 This restriction does not affect
proxy voting by bank executive
directors (as individuals), who
occasionally represent block-
holders.
Composition of Supervisory Boards of the
100 Largest German Firms
Number of Board Seats 
Occupation or Afﬁliation  (percent of total seats)
of Board Member  1986  1988  1992  1993
Employee of the ﬁrm  520  542  519  549
(35)  (36)  (35)  (35)
Labor union executive  197  187  191  211
(13)  (13)  (13)  (14)
Active or retired executive of 368  385  385  427
another ﬁrm, other than a bank  (25)  (26)  (26)  (27)
Executive of a private bank  114  104  103  99
(8)  (7)  (7)  (6)
Executive of a non-private bank  51  57  49  53
(3)  (4)  (3)  (3)
Practicing attorney  147  152  153  155
(10)  (10)  (10)  (10)
Politician or civil servant  69  69  80  67
(5)  (5)  (5)  (4)
Total board members  1,466  1,496  1,480  1,561
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
SOURCE: Bundesverband deutscher Banken <http://www.bdb.de>.
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market.  We focus on three characteristics:
codetermination laws, voting restrictions,
and the existence of shares with multiple
votes.  The common denominator in the
latter two institutional features is a devia-
tion from the one-share/one-vote principle
that underlies the efﬁciency and legitimacy
of corporate governance arrangements
(Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and
Raviv, 1988). 
Codetermination laws are a critical
aspect of the legal environment in
Germany because they impinge on share-
holders’ basic rights to exercise voting con-
trol over the ﬁrm’s assets.  It is usually
thought that those who bear the residual
risks of a ﬁrm’s performance—the equity
owners—should be able to make the key
decisions that contribute to those outcomes.
Codetermination laws partially unbundle
residual control rights from residual cash-
ﬂow rights.  They allow employees to
inﬂuence corporate decision making in
ways that may conﬂict with the interests 
of shareholders.
Voting restrictions in corporate char-
ters constitute a second category of legal
infringement of the property rights of
shareholders in Germany.  A voting restric-
tion is a ceiling on the share of total votes
that a blockholder is allowed to cast at the
annual meeting, regardless of the investor’s
share of contributed capital.  A typical
limit is between 5 percent and 25 percent
of the total votes outstanding.  Any
investor who holds a block larger than the
ceiling amount effectively loses normal
voting rights on the shares in excess of the
ceiling.  Of course, this means that the
blockholder’s stake provides less than one
vote per share, on average, and all other
shareholders correspondingly receive more
than one vote per share.
The ﬁrst voting restrictions were intro-
duced by Germany’s federal government in
the course of privatizing Volkswagenwerk
in 1960.  Initially, blockholders were lim-
ited to 2 percent of the vote, but in 1970
the limit was raised to 20 percent.6 Voting
restrictions enjoyed some popularity after
the ﬁrst oil price shock in the 1970s, when
investors from the Middle East began
acquiring blocks in German ﬁrms.  A
common fear at the time was that these
foreign investors would take control of
blue-chip ﬁrms.  Presumably, this loss of
domestic control would lead to some harm
to the nation’s vital interests.  In recent
years, the number of corporations with
voting restrictions has decreased substan-
tially.  As of October 1997, only 9 out of
800 traded ﬁrms had voting restrictions of
some kind (Hoppenstedt Aktienführer 1998,
1997).  It should be noted that two of the
recent hostile takeovers in Germany suc-
ceeded despite the presence of voting
restrictions.7
The third pertinent feature of the legal
environment in Germany is the prevalence
of shares with multiple votes (preferred
voting stock).  The stock corporation law
does not allow the issuance of such shares
today, but ﬁrms that have issued shares with
multiple votes have not been forced to con-
vert them into ordinary shares.  Shares of
preferred voting stock are not traded at the
stock exchange.  They are a way for large
shareholders to retain control over the ﬁrm
without increasing their investment when
new shares are issued.  As in the cases
already discussed, preferred voting stock
effectively deprives other investors of the
voting power their shares would command
in a one-share/one-vote regime.
A prominent example of shares with
multiple votes is provided by Siemens AG,
where the founding family recently held a
5.29 percent stake in the common stock
but had a 100 percent stake in preferred
voting stock (as of October 1996).  This
preferred voting stock gives the family
holders six votes per share on issues speci-
ﬁed in the charter.  Thus, although the
family owns only 6.94 percent of the cap-
ital, it controls 14.03 percent of the votes
on these special issues (Hoppenstedt
Aktienführer 1997, 1996).
Changes in the shareholder structure
of another ﬁrm with multiple-vote shares
illustrates the relatively large size of such
stakes.  RWE AG, the largest utility in Ger-
many, converted its multiple voting stock
into ordinary shares in accordance with a
shareholder vote at its annual meeting on
6 The Volkswagen AG voting
restrictions differ from others
subsequently adopted by
German stock corporations.
They were established by law
(the Volkswagen Privatization
Act of 1960), and they apply
not only to votes based on
equity positions but also to
proxy votes.  Thus there is an
implied upper limit to the frac-
tion of total voting stock a
bank can represent at the annu-
al meeting, including proxy
votes from small shareholders.
7 The two cases are Feldmühle
Nobel AG (acquired by Stora
Kopparberg Bergslags AB of
Sweden) and Hoesch AG
(acquired by Fried. Krupp
GmbH).  Feldmühle had a 
5 percent voting restriction,
while the limit for Hoesch was
15 percent.  For details on
these cases see Franks and
Mayer (1994).  Schneider-
Lenné (1994, p. 301) notes
that Continental AG’s voting
restriction hindered Pirelli and
its allies in their quest to take
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February 26, 1998.  After years of haggling
over this issue with the VkA (Verband der
kommunalen RWE-Aktionäre, or “Associa-
tion of Local and Regional Governmental
RWE Shareholders”), the management of
RWE ﬁnally succeeded in passing such a
resolution at the annual meeting.  VkA
held all of the outstanding preferred voting
stock, each share of which carried 20 votes.
As a consequence, VkA held 30.2 percent
of the share capital but controlled 59.5
percent of the votes.  To compensate for
the loss of voting power, VkA was given
a one-time cash payment of DM 1.15 bn.
This sum serves as a rough estimate of 
the value of the extra voting rights 
these owners previously enjoyed
<http://www.rwe.de>.
External Control Systems: 
The Stock Market
The stock market disciplines a pub-
licly traded ﬁrm’s management by pricing
the ﬁrm’s overall performance.  Moreover,
it is where control of the ﬁrm is traded.  In
principle, the stock market auctions every
ﬁrm’s assets each day to the team of
investors and managers that believes it can
create the most value by using them.
Are there alternatives to the stock
market as an external control mechanism?
The product market (that is, how successful
the ﬁrm is in selling its products and ser-
vices) provides an important input for the
stock market evaluation process rather than
providing an efﬁcient substitute for it.  Its
discipline of a ﬁrm, in the absence of other
controls, is likely to be very slow in coming
and quite disruptive—i.e., culminating in
bankruptcy—when it does occur (Townsend,
1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Jensen,
1993).  Bankruptcy, in turn, leads to a shift
of control from shareholders to bondholders,
who may not be the best parties to run the
ﬁrm (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
This section describes several impor-
tant features of the German stock market
in terms of its ability to function as an
external corporate control system.  In par-
ticular, we discuss the historically limited
scope of the stock market in Germany, the
extent and nature of shareholder concen-
tration, the scarcity of hostile takeovers,
the role of the pay-as-you-go private pen-
sion system in retarding ﬁnancial-market
development, the role of mutual funds,
and ﬁnally, the importance of cross share-
holdings and pyramid ownership structures.
Role of the Stock Market. Stock markets
have traditionally been of little importance
as a corporate control mechanism in Ger-
many.  There were 682 stock-exchange-
traded corporations in Germany at year-end
1955, with total market value equal to 12.5
percent of GNP (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1988).  At the same time, there were 3,007
traded ﬁrms in the United States with
market capitalization of nine percent of
GNP (Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 1957, pp. 91, 244).  By the end of
1995, there were 802 traded stock corpora-
tions in Germany, with total market value
equal to 24 percent of GNP (Deutsche
Börse AG, 1997b).  In the United States,
on the other hand, some 9,566 traded
ﬁrms accounted for a market capitalization
equivalent to 105 percent of GNP (Wall
Street Journal, 1998, pp. 395-97; Board of
Governors, 1998). 
By way of contrast, assets held by the
banking sector are relatively more signiﬁ-
cant in Germany than in the United States.
The assets of the banking sector (not
including the central bank) amounted to
297 percent of GDP in 1960 and 234 per-
cent in 1996.  The corresponding ﬁgures
for the United States were 66 percent in
1960 and 78 percent in 1996.
Germany has eight stock exchanges,
among which the Frankfurter Wertpapier-
börse (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) is the
largest, with about 75 percent of total
turnover.  It is the ﬁfth-largest stock
exchange in the world, following the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the U.S.
NASDAQ (over-the-counter) market, and
the London and Tokyo stock markets.  
In 1996, its trading volume amounted to
15 percent of the trading volume at the
NYSE and 70 percent of the trading
volume in Tokyo (Aktionskreis Finanzplatz
e.V., 1997).  There were 681 ﬁrms listed onGerman stock exchanges in 1996, together
with 123 ﬁrms that trade over the counter
only.  In the United States, 2,172 ﬁrms
were listed on the NYSE; 5,167 on the
NASDAQ; and 688 on the American
Exchange (Hoppenstedt Aktienführer 
1998, 1997).
There are three main market segments
at the Frankfurt stock exchange.  The ﬁrst
segment (Amtlicher Handel) listed 517
domestic ﬁrms at the end of 1996, plus
219 international ﬁrms (Deutsche Börse
AG, 1997a, p. 11).  The listing requirements
of the second market segment (Geregelter
Markt) are less strict than those in the ﬁrst
segment.  This market serves mainly as a
“launching pad” for young ﬁrms.  The third
market segment is the over-the-counter
market, where listing requirements are
minimal.  Finally, an innovative new
trading arena was introduced in March
1997 (Neuer Markt; see below). 
A number of laws (Finanzmarktförder-
ungsgesetze) have been passed in recent
years to improve the competitiveness of
Germany as a ﬁnancial center in Europe
(Finanzplatz Deutschland).  A signiﬁcant
reform was the introduction of a new
market segment called Neuer Markt at the
Frankfurt stock exchange in March 1997.
This new market is meant to attract small
and medium-sized, innovative companies.
Firms listed in this market must publish
their ﬁnancial statements in English, 
base their prospectuses on international
standards, and accept a takeover code
(Deutsche Börse AG, 1996).  Another major
reform was the introduction of Xetra, an
electronic trading system, in the ﬁrst market
segment (Amtlicher Handel) at the Frank-
furt stock exchange.  This reform eliminated
order books;  transactions are now fully
transparent to all market participants.
Germany currently has no mandatory
takeover code except for ﬁrms listed on
the Neuer Markt.  Instead, the takeover
code is a voluntary agreement outlining
recommended practices.  It was introduced
in July 1995 and was amended and tight-
ened in January 1998 (Bundesministerium
der Finanzen, 1998).  The revised volun-
tary takeover code had been signed by 
61 percent of the DAX-100 ﬁrms as of 
February 2, 1998 (Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, February 3, 1998).8 It requires
that a bidder make a tender offer for all
outstanding shares of the target once a
controlling block in the ﬁrm has been
acquired.  Control is deﬁned as ownership
of more than 50 percent of the voting
stock or the ability to cast at least 75 per-
cent of the votes at the annual meeting,
which may require less than 75 percent of
the total shares outstanding, since some
shareholders do not vote.  Block holdings
are posted for public information at the
ofﬁcial website of the Bundesaufsichtsamt
für den Wertpapierhandel (the equivalent of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion), <http://www.bawe.de>.
The voluntary takeover code has met
strong resistance from some companies.
For example, BMW, Hoechst, and
Volkswagen have refused to sign on
because they believe a large shareholder
should not be forced to bid for all of the
ﬁrm’s outstanding shares when the
purpose of the block holding is to protect
speciﬁc property rights associated with
relation-speciﬁc investments.
Shareholder Concentration. One impor-
tant feature of the German stock market is
the prevalence of large blockholders—that
is, individuals, families, or ﬁrms that hold
a high percentage of the outstanding stock
of a single traded ﬁrm.  Blockholders 
provide a form of concentrated ownership
that mitigates the free-rider problem 
often found in ﬁrms with many small
shareholders, none of whom has strong
incentives to monitor the management.
An alternative to concentrated ownership
is the presence of a delegated monitor who
represents dispersed owners—for example,
a universal bank armed with the power to
vote small shareholders’ stakes in proxy.
Since 1995, German law has required
mandatory disclosure of shareholdings of
more than 5 percent of the outstanding
equity.  Earlier estimates of block owner-
ship (such as the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer)
were reasonably accurate, however.9
Table 3, based on Hoppenstedt data as of
8 The DAX (Deutscher
Aktienindex) is the stock mar-
ket index operated by the
Frankfurt stock exchange. 
9 Prior to 1995, the threshold for
mandatory disclosure of a block
shareholding in Germany was
25 percent.  Spurred by efforts




1, 1995.  Investors must now
disclose each purchase of stock
that causes their stake in a ﬁrm
to exceed any of the critical
thresholds of 5, 10, 25, 50, or
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30September  30, 1993, as used in Gorton and
Schmid (1998a), provides information on the
identity  of the largest blockholders in
German ﬁrms. 
Table 3 shows that only 9 out of 198
large German ﬁrms (4.5 percent) had no
blockholders at all (that is, all shares were
dispersed among small shareholders).  Of
the 189 ﬁrms with  blockholders, 165 had
at least one blockholder with a stake of 25
percent or more.  Some 125 ﬁrms (63 per-
cent of the sample) had a blockholder with
at least 50 percent of the equity, and 61
ﬁrms (31 percent) had a blockholder with
a share of at least 75 percent.  This high
level of shareholder concentration in Ger-
many far exceeds that in the United States
(Franks and Mayer, 1994, p. 7).10
As noted above, universal banks may
also hold blocks, but they are relatively
infrequent blockholders.  In terms of the
number of blocks held, individuals, fami-
lies, and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are all more
important.  Gorton and Schmid (1998a)
found that only 39 of the 198 ﬁrms in
their sample (20 percent) counted a bank
among their blockholders, and the blocks
were smaller than typical blocks.  In only
three ﬁrms did a bank hold a block of 50
percent or more.  Table 4 provides details
on the equity stakes held by the 10 largest
private banks in all German corporations.
The table shows that, while the number of
ﬁrms in which banks hold equity positions
has increased over the last decade, there
has been a decline in the frequency with
which these stakes give banks outright
control or a blocking minority position.
With respect to traded ﬁrms only, the
bottom part of Table 4 shows that private
banks’ equity stakes have actually been
falling in recent years (from 46 to 30).  As
was true for the set of corporations as a
whole, banks’ equity stakes in traded ﬁrms
are increasingly those of a minority share-
holder—when they exist at all.
Similar conclusions emerge when one
looks at bank equity ownership patterns
among all corporations (i.e., counting all
shares owned in traded and nontraded
incorporated ﬁrms).  The 10 largest private
banks held only 1.3 percent of the face
value of corporate equity in 1976, while in
1994, this number was a mere 0.4 percent
(Bundesverband deutscher Banken
<http://www.bdb.de>).11 The decline in
the number of blocks and the fraction of
corporate equity held by banks may indi-
cate that, as Germany moves to a more
market-oriented system of corporate
ﬁnance, the bank blockholders’ ability to
add value to the ﬁrms they (partly) own
has diminished.
Hostile Takeovers.  Only a few hostile
takeovers have occurred in post-World
War II Germany, and there has never been
a management-led leveraged buyout
(LBO).12 One reason for the relative inac-
tivity of the market for corporate control
in Germany is the unusually small number
of listed ﬁrms in comparison to the size
and vitality of its economy.  However, two
10A survey of stock-exchange-list-
ed ﬁrms in the United States in
1984 found that only 20 per-
cent of the ﬁrms had at least
one non-ofﬁcer who owned 10
percent of ﬁrm’s stock; 13 per-
cent of the ﬁrms were majority-
owned (see Holderness and
Sheehan, 1988).  
11These numbers should be
viewed skeptically, however,
because they are the least com-
prehensive of three measures
of equity: face value, book
value, and market value.  Face
or par value is the stated value
of the shares at issue.  Book
value includes face value plus
paid-in surplus and retained
earnings.  Market value is the
number of shares outstanding
times the market price per
share.  The market value of a
ﬁrm’s equity is often the most
meaningful concept of the
value of a ﬁrm.
12Franks and Mayer (1994)
describe two successful hostile
takeovers and the unsuccessful
attempt of Pirelli, an Italian 
tire maker, to take over
Continental AG.  More recently,
Hochtief AG, a construction
company, secretly acquired a
majority stake in Philipp
Holzmann AG, a competitor.
Hochtief and its advisor, Deutsche
Bank, then petitioned the
European Commission in April
1997 for permission to pool
their equity stakes in order to
carry out a full merger between
Hochtief and Holzmann.  The
German antitrust agency
(Bundeskartellamt), opposed
the takeover.  The European
Commission declined in June
1997 to issue a ruling in the
case, citing their lack of stand-
ing in the case (Die Welt,
March 26, and June 4, 1997,
and Gieskes, March 24, and
June 4, 1997).
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Largest Blockholders in a
Sample of Large German Firms
Number of ﬁrms
Firms without any blockholder 9
Firms with a blockholder 189
Total  198
Type of largest blockholder  Number of blocks
Foreign government  1
Not-for-proﬁt organization (Verein)  1
Domestic insurance company  2
Domestic government 
(including foundations)  11
Domestic bank  16
Foreign nonﬁnancial company  21
Family (including trusts)  43
Domestic nonﬁnancial company  96
Total  200*
Size of largest block held 
by domestic nonﬁnancial 
company (fraction of voting 
stock = x)  Number of blocks
x < 0.25  4
0.25 ≤ x ≤ 0.5  14
0.5 < x ≤ 0.75  32
x > 0.75  46
Total  96
* Two ﬁrms had blockholders of equal size.
SOURCE: Gorton and Schmid (1998a, Table 3); Saling
Aktienführer 1994, 1993
Table 3other (not mutually exclusive) explanations
have been suggested.  First, takeovers by
means of stock market transactions may be
more costly in Germany.  As noted earlier  in
connection with the recent takeover attempt
of Thyssen by Krupp, worker resistance
and public disapproval may raise  the eco-
nomic hurdle that any proposed takeover
must clear.  Transactions  that are barely
proﬁtable on their own ﬁnancial merits will
not be undertaken if worker and public
relations costs are too high.  Worker repre-
sentatives on the supervisory board may
resist even friendly takeovers unless they
are able to share in some of the gains.
Anticipation of this kind of “rent-seeking
behavior” necessarily decreases the number
of transactions that will be attempted.
Second, control mechanisms other than
stock market takeovers may be more effec-
tive in removing corporate inefﬁciency  in
Germany.  Universal banks and other large
investors may be able to execute restruc-
turings and control transfers behind the
scenes at lower cost than is possible on the
stock market.  Takeovers may create costs
for many “stakeholders” in the affected  ﬁrms,
some of which are not taken into account
by the parties who initiate the change in
control (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Private Pension System.  One factor that
contributes to the underdevelopment of the
German stock market is the rather undevel-
oped nature of the private pension system.
Most importantly, only about 50 percent of
currently employed workers in western
Germany will receive private pensions
(Betriebsrente), and virtually no workers in
eastern Germany can expect private pen-
sion beneﬁts (Bayerische Staatskanzlei,
1995).  Second, private pension payments
typically represent a supplement of only
about 10 percent to 30 percent on top of a
typical retiree’s pension from the state-run
system.  Finally, Germany’s private pensions
are overwhelmingly provided on a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) basis.  While this ﬁnancing
principle applies to public old-age and dis-
ability insurance systems around the world,
it also applies to corporate pensions in Ger-
many (Schneider-Lenné, 1992).  Instead of
paying contributions for employees’ pen-
sions into a separate pension fund, German
employers merely make provisions on their
balance sheets.  Only current pension 
obligations require current expenditures.
Of course, this means that accrual of future
pension liabilities provides a source of
ﬁnancing (cash ﬂow) for current corpo-
rate activities.
In a fully funded pension system, on
the other hand, increases in future pension
liabilities must be matched with current
cash outlays required to purchase pension
assets, usually long-term ﬁnancial assets
like stocks and bonds.  The PAYG nature
of private pension provision in Germany
therefore has two effects, both of which
reduce the importance of markets for long-
term ﬁnancial assets: First, pension provi-
sioning on the balance sheet reduces 
the demand for ﬁnancial assets to fund
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Equity Stakes Held by the 10 Largest
Private Banks  
1986  1989  1994
Number of ﬁrms in which banks 
hold equity stakes (includes all corporations)  89  101  135
Number of ﬁrms in which
Fraction of the ﬁrm’s outstanding equity  banks held this equity stake
owned by banks (x = all banks’ stake)  (percentage)
0.1 < x ≤ 0.25 (minority)  47  63  77
(53)  (62)  (57)
0.25 < x ≤ 0.5 (blocking minority)  33  29  43
(37)  (29)  (32)
x > 0.5 (majority)  9  9  15
(10)  (9)  (11)
Number of traded  ﬁrms in which banks 
hold equity stakes  46  38  30
Number of ﬁrms in which 
Fraction of the ﬁrm’s outstanding equity banks held this equity stake
owned by banks (x = all banks’ stake)  (percentage)
0.1 < x ≤ 0.25 (minority)  19  23  19
(41)  (61)  (63)
0.25 < x ≤ 0.5 (blocking minority)  23  12  8
(50)  (32)  (27)
x > 0.5 (majority)  4  3  3
(9)  (8)  (10)
SOURCE: Bundesverband deutscher Banken <http://www.bdb.de>.
Table 4pension-holders’ accounts.  Instead, pension
holders receive unsecuritized claims on their
employers.  Second, the ability to ﬁnance
current operations by increasing pension
liabilities reduces ﬁrms’ supply of long-term
financial assets to the market.  Consequently,
a country like Germany with a PAYG private
pension system will have a smaller capital-
ization of stock and bond markets, along
with lower trading volumes.
Investment Funds. Another retarding
factor in the German stock-market envi-
ronment has been the late start of mutual
fund investing, a convenient and low-cost
way for households to accumulate long-
term ﬁnancial assets.  As late as 1960,
investment funds’ stock holdings were
essentially zero.  By 1990, this ﬁgure had
risen to 4.3 percent of stock market capi-
talization and it had increased further to
7.5 percent by 1995 (Hoppenstedt Aktien-
führer 1997, 1996, p. xxxvii).  In the
United States, mutual funds held 12.8 per-
cent of corporate equity at the end of 1995
(Board of Governors, 1998).  The fact that
German mutual funds have grown so fast
in recent years may indicate that German
households are concerned that the state-
run pension system will not be able to sus-
tain the current level of pension payments.
Of course, we cannot say for sure whether
the growth of stock mutual funds means
that households have increased their
overall holdings of stock relative to other
investments.  Findings based on direct
ownership data reveal that the fraction of
domestic shares held by domestic house-
holds fell from 31.8 percent in 1960, to
16.9 in 1990, and further to 14.6 in 1995.
Other shareholder categories are nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the public
sector, and foreign investors (Hoppenstedt
Aktienführer 1997, 1996, p. xxxvii).  Since
households are also the ultimate owners of
corporate stock through indirect means,
the fraction of stock directly or indirectly
owned by households remains unknown.13
Cross Shareholdings. A cross shareholding
is an equity position one ﬁrm holds in
another ﬁrm.  It is possible for a web of
cross shareholdings to exist in which ﬁrm A
holds equity in ﬁrm B, which holds equity
in ﬁrm C, which, in turn, holds an equity
stake in ﬁrm A.  It may be difﬁcult or impos-
sible for an outsider to make a takeover bid
or even to acquire a signiﬁcant stake in a
ﬁrm that is enmeshed in this kind of com-
plex cross shareholding arrangement.
The most signiﬁcant cross shareholding
structure in Germany is centered on Allianz
AG, the holding company of Europe’s
largest insurance group.  This network of
cross shareholdings encompasses several
other important ﬁnancial ﬁrms, including
Munich Re, the world’s largest reinsurance
company, and both Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank, two of the largest German
banks.  The most common size of the stakes
held in this network are 5 percent, 10 per-
cent, or 25 percent of the target’s equity.
Some cross shareholdings were eliminated
recently as a result of the merger of Bay-
erische Vereinsbank and Bayerische
Hypotheken-und Wechsel-Bank, each of
which comprised nodes in the Munich-
based network surrounding Allianz.
It is likely that more cross sharehold-
ings will be eliminated in Germany 
(and in Europe as a whole) as the ﬁnan-
cial-services sector consolidates.  It has
long been said that one of the purposes of
cross shareholdings was to prepare for and
facilitate consolidation.  This is particularly
likely to be true in the case of cross-border
cross shareholdings within Europe.
Pyramids. Pyramids are a particular form
of interﬁrm shareholding arrangement in
which ﬁrm A holds a stake in ﬁrm B, which
holds a stake in ﬁrm C.  The distinguishing
characteristic of a pyramid arrangement is
that ﬁrm A is attempting to exercise control
over ﬁrm C while minimizing its ﬁnancial
investment in ﬁrm C, either directly or
indirectly.  Hence, a broad base of assets is
controlled by a narrow pinnacle of equity
investment.  For example, if ﬁrm A holds a
stake of slightly more than 50 percent in
ﬁrm B, which in turn owns slightly more
than 50 percent of the votes in ﬁrm C, then
firm A can effectively exercise control over
ﬁrm C with just over 25 percent indirect
13Lower reported stockholdings
by households may simply
reﬂect changes in ﬁrm organi-
zational structures.  For exam-
ple, suppose there is initially
only one stock corporation
owned entirely by households,
the equity of which is valued at
DM 100.  Now the ﬁrm creates
a holding company — the 
purpose of which is to hold the
equity in the operating company.
Households receive all the
shares in the new holding com-
pany, worth DM 100.  The
holding company’s assets con-
sist of a 100-percent share of
the operating subsidiary's equity,
also worth DM 100 in total.  If
both the holding company and
the operating subsidiary are 
listed on the stock exchange,
households’ share of total stock-
holdings falls from 100 percent
to 50 percent, even though
nothing fundamental has
changed.  In fact, many of the
largest ﬁrms have recently
moved toward a holding com-
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33ownership of the voting stock of ﬁrm C.
Without the pyramid structure involving
ﬁrm B, control over ﬁrm C would require
ﬁrm A to hold more than a 50 percent
direct investment.
There have been numerous cases of
pyramiding among German ﬁrms.  Some
are motivated by the desire to “disenfran-
chise” minority shareholders, but many
appear to be attempts to deal efﬁciently
with more legitimate governance problems,
such as joint ventures or relationship-
speciﬁc investments.14
Joint ventures are sometimes
organized as subsidiaries owned jointly by
the parties to the venture.  A joint-venture
subsidiary may, in turn, create other joint
ventures, which are also organized as sub-
sidiaries.  Minority shareholders may be
invited to hold stakes in some of the sub-
sidiaries not so that they may be expropri-
ated by the majority or controlling ﬁrms,
but in order to promote cooperation at
least cost to the ultimate organizers.
Another reason for pyramid sharehold-
ings involves relation-speciﬁc investments
or commitments made by customers or
suppliers.  If agents transact repeatedly at
one or more stages of production, a
pyramid may emerge as a way for a ﬁrm to
cement important input or output relation-
ships.  In the absence of investments in
such relationships, one or more of the par-
ties may be subject to a “holdup problem,”
a form of opportunism that reduces eco-
nomic efﬁciency in the same way as taxa-
tion or other forms of anticipated but
essentially arbitrary wealth expropriation.
If pyramiding occurs primarily to prevent
opportunistic behavior by one or more
ﬁrms that interact repeatedly, one could
liken it to vertical integration.
A case watched closely by German
competition authorities involves RWE AG.
Local and regional administrative bodies in
the state of North Rhine-Westphalia held
about 57 percent of the votes in RWE as of
October 1997.  Both RWE and these public
bodies are engaged in large-scale construc-
tion projects on an ongoing basis.  RWE
owns a 56.1 percent stake in Hochtief AG,
a construction ﬁrm (41.1 percent direct;
15 percent indirect).  Furthermore,
Hochtief holds a 24.9 direct stake in Philipp
Holzmann AG, one of its few signiﬁcant
competitors, plus an option to buy another
10 percent stake held by Commerzbank AG
(Hoppenstedt Aktienführer 1998, 1997).  The
motivations for RWE and the local authori-
ties to build this pyramid structure are not
clear, nor are the competitive effects it may






We now turn to the empirical evidence
concerning universal banking and codeter-
mination as they affect corporate governance
in Germany.  As the previous section made
clear, both internal and external control
mechanisms are available for guiding and
disciplining ﬁrms’ managements.  Germany’s
institutions of universal banking and code-
termination both shape and are shaped by
Germany’s internal and external control
environments.  Hence, sorting out cause
and effect in the highly interrelated and
complex system of corporate governance
in Germany (or any other country) is a
formidable challenge. 
Before beginning our review, it is
worthwhile to point out that the available
empirical evidence on corporate
governance in Germany is far from com-
plete.  Only a few rigorous quantitative
studies analyze the inﬂuence of universal
banking or codetermination on the perfor-
mance of German ﬁrms, and these few are
sometimes handicapped by small or unrep-
resentative datasets.  These shortcomings
can be traced directly to the paucity of
readily available data on German ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial structures.  Relatively few ﬁrms
are publicly traded, and those that are do
not face the type of disclosure requirements
that are common in the United States.  The
lack of empirical evidence may have con-
vinced some observers that there is no hope
of drawing solid conclusions regarding
14Franks and Mayer (1994) illus-
trate the practice of pyramiding
in Germany with the case of
Mercedes Holding AG, which
served as “ﬁrm B” to allow a
few large German investors
(“ﬁrm A”) to maintain control
over Daimler-Benz AG (“ﬁrm
C”) despite investing less than
a majority of the capital in the
target ﬁrm.  Mercedes Holding
AG is atypical in some respects,
however.  It was set up in
1975 with the encouragement
of government ofﬁcials as an
anti-takeover device when it
appeared that oil-rich investors
from the Middle East might
attempt to gain control over
some of the “crown jewels” of
German industry in the wake of
very low stock prices, and it
was dissolved in 1994.
JULY/AUGUST 1998
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
34universal banks, codetermination, or any
of the other unique or controversial
aspects of German corporate governance.
We hope to dispel some of the skepticism
that surrounds these issues by reviewing
recent empirical work that begins to lay the
foundation for reliable analysis.
Universal Banking
The ﬁrst econometric analysis focusing
on the inﬂuence of universal banks in Ger-
many was conducted by Cable (1985).
Subsequently, studies by Edwards and Fis-
cher (1994), Franks and Mayer (1994),
Kaplan (1994), Elston and Albach (1995),
Schmid (1996a,b,c),  Gorton and Schmid
(1998b), and others appeared.  Without
exception, sample sizes in these studies are
small by U.S. academic standards.
Universal Banks, Control Structures,
and Firm Performance. In a pioneering
study, Cable (1985) investigated the inﬂu-
ence of universal banks on the performance
of German ﬁrms by analyzing a sample of
48 traded German companies.  His obser-
vations were chosen from a list of the 100
largest German companies in 1974.  It is
revealing to note that this list became avail-
able only because a government antitrust
commission compiled the basic data and
published its results (Monopolkommission,
1978).  There had been no comprehensive
publicly available source for even this rudi-
mentary information previously.
Cable regressed ﬁnancial performance
on several characteristics of the ﬁrm’s gov-
ernance structure.  He measured ﬁnancial
performance from accounting data averaged
over the period 1968-72.  Explanatory vari-
ables drawn from the ﬁrm’s governance
structure included the concentration of
shareholdings among investors in the ﬁrm
(measured by a Herﬁndahl index) and the
fraction of votes exercised by banks at
annual meetings in 1975, among others.
Votes controlled by banks included both
the shares they owned and the proxy votes
they exercised for clients.  The author also
included several normalizing regressors,
such as industry dummy variables.
Cable found that shareholder concen-
tration and bank voting power had positive
and signiﬁcant inﬂuences on ﬁrm perfor-
mance.  In other words, the more concen-
trated the ownership among the ﬁrm’s
shareholdings and the larger the proportion
of votes cast at annual meetings by banks,
the better was a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance.
These ﬁndings appeared to provide strong
support for universal banking as a means of
enhancing the performance of German
ﬁrms.  Schmid (1996a,b) conﬁrmed Cable’s
qualitative results while arguing that Cable’s
original methodology was suspect.
Cable’s performance measure was
ﬂawed in two ways (Schmid, 1996a,b).
First, his  observations of ﬁrm performance
were for a time period before the ﬁrm’s con-
trol structure was observed, when, in fact,
the causal hypothesis being tested—that a
ﬁrm’s control structure affects its perfor-
mance—requires precisely the reverse
ordering.  Thus, Cable’s ﬁndings cannot be
used to rule out the alternative hypothesis
that it is good performance of the ﬁrm that
causes high levels of shareholder concen-
tration and bank voting power. Second,
Cable’s performance measure is difﬁcult 
to interpret.  It is the ratio of net income 
to total assets, i.e. it relates equityholders’
income to the capital provided by equity-
holders and debtholders.  More appropriate
measures of ﬁrm performance may be
derived by dividing net income by (book
value of) equity (yielding ROE, return 
on equity), or interest expense (income 
of debtholders) plus net income divided 
by total assets.
Gorton and Schmid (1998b) provided
additional evidence that German ﬁrms’
control structures are systematically related
to their ﬁnancial performance.  Combining
Cable’s dataset with another compiled by
Böhm (1992), Gorton and Schmid exam-
ined the relationship between several indi-
cators of a ﬁrm’s control structure and three
different performance measures:  ROE,
ROA (return on assets), and the market-
to-book ratio of equity (MTB).  Using 82
observations from 1975 and 56 observations
from 1986, Gorton and Schmid found that
bank equity positions and shareholder
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35concentration measures, in general, were
positively related to ﬁrm performance and
statistically signiﬁcant.  Although the sta-
tistical signiﬁcance of the relationship was
not strong in every regression, the coefﬁ-
cients were never signiﬁcantly negative.
For example, the null hypothesis that
bank proxy voting makes no difference to
ﬁrm performance could not be rejected in
any of the speciﬁcations.  On the other
hand, Gorton and Schmid (1998b) found
that direct ownership of shares by banks
was signiﬁcantly and positively related to
measures of market value.  In particular, a
1-percentage-point increase in the fraction
of a ﬁrm’s shares held by banks was associ-
ated with an increase in the market value
of the ﬁrm’s equity of between 0.60 percent
and 0.86 percent.
Gorton and Schmid (1998b) used 
their dataset to investigate several other
hypotheses concerning universal banking
and corporate governance. They found no
evidence of a change in the relationship
between bank-dominated control structures
and ﬁrm performance between 1975 and
1986.  They also found no evidence to
indicate that universal banks exploit any
conﬂicts of interest that may exist in carrying
out their roles as lenders, shareholders, and
custodians (proxy voters) of small share-
holders’ shares.
To test for conﬂicts of interest, Gorton
and Schmid (1998b) checked for nonlin-
earities in the impact of shareholder con-
centration, the banks’ equity holdings, and
proxy voting on ﬁrm performance.  The
presence of such nonlinearities could indi-
cate a conﬂict of interest for banks in their
roles as equityholders and custodians of
small shareholders’ votes.  Under the con-
ﬂict-of-interest hypothesis, the way banks
use proxy votes depends on how much
equity they own in the ﬁrm in question.
Nonbank blockholders may alter but not
eliminate the bank’s conﬂict of interest, so
there will be another nonlinearity in the
relationship.  On the basis of Gorton and
Schmid’s results, one cannot reject the
hypothesis of no conﬂict of interest.
In a related study, Edwards and
Fischer (1994) concluded that German
banks do not use the proxy votes they con-
trol to install their own representatives on
supervisory boards.  The authors reasoned
from these results that banks do not act in
the interests of small shareholders and
therefore are subject to a conﬂict of
interest.  However, Franks and Mayer
(1994) and Gorton and Schmid (1998b)
provided evidence contrary to the ﬁndings
of Edwards and Fischer (1994); that is,
they found that ownership does translate
into supervisory board representation.
Banks do not appear to interfere with
shareholder representation according to
actual ownership. 
How Do Universal Banks Affect Firm
Performance? The bulk of the evidence
reviewed suggests that universal bank
involvement has a positive effect on ﬁrm
performance; Edwards and Fischer (1994)
is the exception.  These studies are very
crude in one sense, however:  They merely
test for a statistical relationship, rather
than providing much economic insight
into what is taking place.  A slightly dif-
ferent approach to the general question 
of the relationship between universal
banking and ﬁrm performance is to look
for speciﬁc mechanisms or channels
through which universal banks may
improve (or hinder) performance.
One strand of the corporate ﬁnance
literature suggests that banking relation-
ships may improve ﬁrm performance
because so-called “internal” capital mar-
kets reduce the information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders.  They also
buffer ﬁrms from shocks that reduce the
efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation in
“external” (public) markets.  Using evidence
from Japan, one study, Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (1990), concluded that
“main-bank” relationships reduce ﬁrms’
costs of ﬁnancial distress.
Elston and Albach (1995) reported
that evidence for Germany pointed to
reduced liquidity constraints when strong
banking relationships were present.  They
compared a group of 29 ﬁrms that had sig-
niﬁcant bank ownership stakes in 1991 to
another group of 92 ﬁrms that did not
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The authors examined the periods 1967-
72, 1973-82, and 1983-92, ﬁnding no 
liquidity constraints (deﬁned as no corre-
lation between internally generated cash
ﬂow and investment expenditures) in the
ﬁrst two subperiods for either group of
ﬁrms.  Finding a positive relationship in
the latest subperiod only for ﬁrms without
a bank blockholder, they concluded that
ﬁrms with close bank ties have better
access to ﬁnancial capital.
One should be cautious in interpreting
Elston and Albach’s results, however.
First, authors such as Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) have called into question some of
the critical identifying assumptions used in
the literature on the cash-ﬂow sensitivity
of investment, of which Elston and Albach
is a part.  Even proponents of this stream
of research, such as Hubbard (1998),
admit that there is a serious problem in
using average Q (market-to-book ratio of a
ﬁrm’s assets) instead of marginal q, to mea-
sure the ﬁrm’s marginal incentive to invest.
Unfortunately, Elston and Albach use the
less appropriate average Q.  Second, Elston
and Albach make the unrealistic assump-
tion that the ﬁrms’ shareholder structures
were invariant over the 25-year period
they analyzed.  In other words, ownership
structures were assumed to be completely
constant over time.  Finally, they
erroneously classiﬁed one industrial com-
pany as a bank, contaminating their bank-
ownership data.15
Is It Universal Banking or Relationship
Banking that Matters? A natural ques-
tion to ask is whether the positive inﬂu-
ence on ﬁrm performance associated with
a banking relationship requires banks to
operate as universal banks.  Couldn’t a
strictly commercial banking relationship
ease liquidity constraints just as well?  In
fact, the traditional German Hausbank
(house-bank) relationship is based on
commercial- rather than investment-
banking activities (Fischer, 1990; Elsas
and Krahnen, 1998).
Schmid (1996c) argued that universal
banking enhances ﬁrm performance above
and beyond what commercial and invest-
ment banking can do separately.  Using
data for all 62 German stock corporations
for which he could identify a bank block-
holder at the end of 1990, Schmid found
that the average ﬁrm’s ROE displayed a U-
shaped pattern when plotted against the
level of banks’ equity holdings.  Underlying
this pattern, Schmid found that a ﬁrm’s
interest rate on debt was monotonically
increasing in bank equity holdings.
The logic of Schmid’s (1996c)
argument is that universal banks are 
able to price commercial- and investment-
banking services jointly, a strategy that is
not feasible when such banks provide their
individual services independently.  Cross-
subsidization may be beneﬁcial in this
context because of a free-rider problem
among shareholders.  Generally, an indi-
vidual shareholder bears the full cost of
monitoring his investment, but he receives
its beneﬁt only in proportion to his owner-
ship stake.  This disparity drives a wedge
between the optimal level of monitoring
from the perspective of individual share-
holders and the socially optimal level.  
As a result, monitoring intensity is too low
from a social planner’s point of view.16
A bank that owns a small block will
use an increase in voting power (associated
with increased ownership) to divert earn-
ings away from equity.  As the bank’s block
becomes larger, however, the bank stands
to earn a higher fraction of the net (after
interest) income created by its active moni-
toring of a ﬁrm’s management.  This is why,
at high levels of ownership, the bank’s
incentive to divert earnings away from equity
declines with further increases in the size
of the block.  Taken together, these consid-
erations lead one to expect a U-shaped rela-
tionship between a ﬁrm’s ROE and the level
of bank equity ownership.
The bank has an incentive to translate
higher voting power into higher interest
rates on bank debt because increasing the
ﬁrm’s interest burden increases the ﬁrm’s
tax shield.  One would therefore expect a
monotonically increasing interest rate as a
function of bank equity ownership.17  How-
ever, banks cannot increase the ﬁrm’s
15Apparently misled by its name,
the authors classiﬁed Holderbank
Financière Glaris Ltd. as a bank.
In fact, Holderbank is a cement
group.  Its name is taken from
the town of Holderbank, located
in the Swiss canton of Aargau,
where the company was found-
ed in 1912 <http://
www.holderbank.com>.
16Given that the marginal return
on corporate control is decreas-
ing and the marginal costs are
non-decreasing, the actual level
of monitoring exerted by the
bank will be too low from the
standpoint of maximizing the
wealth of all shareholders.
17This relationship is consistent
with a U-shaped relationship
between ROE and bank equity
ownership because the total
return on assets is a weighted
sum of the interest rate on debt
and the return to equity.  The
weights are the fractions of
debt and equity in total assets,
respectively.  These weights
may adjust as the size of the
bank’s block changes.
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petition from other banks limits the interest
rate that the bank blockholder can impose
on the ﬁrm.
Germany’s large universal banks 
have long been accused of “overcharging”
for loans (Hilferding, 1910).  Modern 
corporate governance theory provides 
more subtle and benign explanations of
this phenomenon (for example, Rajan,
1992).  The higher price that universal
banks charge on loans may be an efﬁcient
mechanism for internalizing the beneﬁts
they create, but cannot capture, in their
function as a delegated monitor for small
shareholders.
The empirical evidence reviewed in
this section provides some insight into the
method and effectiveness of universal
banking as a component of the German
corporate governance system.  However,
these results are of limited use for cross-
country comparisons because  the impor-
tance and interrelationships of individual
corporate control features vary across dif-
ferent ﬁnancial systems.  Therefore, the
conclusions one may draw from studies 
of corporate governance in Germany do
not necessarily apply to the United States
or to any other country.  
Codetermination
The ﬁrst rigorous empirical research
investigating the effects of codetermina-
tion on ﬁrm performance was FitzRoy and
Kraft (1993).18 Gorton and Schmid (1998a)
and Schmid and Seger (1998) provided
additional evidence on this topic.
Codetermination and Firm Performance.
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) examined the
impact of the 1976 Codetermination Law
on the productivity of 68 big German com-
panies.  Their sample was chosen to include
firms that were required by the new law to
increase from one third to one half the
fraction of supervisory board seats occu-
pied by worker representatives.  FitzRoy
and Kraft (1993) estimated a translog pro-
duction function to measure ﬁrm produc-
tivity in both 1975 and 1983.  The authors
reasoned that these years represented the
pre- and post-legislation environments and
similar stages of the business cycle.
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) estimated
that the introduction of equal representa-
tion by workers on supervisory boards
reduced the ‘value added’ of the affected
ﬁrms by 19.7 percent.19 Moreover, the
authors concluded that the average ﬁrm’s
ROE declined by 5 percentage points as a
result of the legislation.  This is a substan-
tial reduction, given that the sample mean
of ROE equaled only 9.3 percent in 1975.
Schmid and Seger (1998) analyzed a
sample of 160 large traded stock corpora-
tions observed in 1975, 1986, and 1990.
The study exploited publicly available
information on bank proxy voting (as in
Gorton and Schmid, 1998b) and obtained
64 observations by collecting the attendance
lists from annual meetings.  As did Cable,
Schmid and Seger regressed a ﬁnancial
performance measure—the market-to-book
ratio of equity (MTB)—on proxies for
ownership and control characteristics as
well as normalizing regressors such as ﬁrm
size and industry dummy variables.  As in
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993), Schmid and
Seger compared ﬁrms with equal represen-
tation to ﬁrms with one-third representa-
tion of workers on the supervisory board.
In contrast to FitzRoy and Kraft, Schmid
and Seger did not compare the pre- and
post-legislation performance of a given
ﬁrm but instead pooled their observations
and used year dummies and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
control variables to isolate the effects of
codetermination.
Schmid and Seger (1998) measured
the impact of codetermination by examining
the regression coefﬁcient on a dummy vari-
able that took a value of one if the ﬁrm
had more than 2,000 workers, and was
therefore subject to the new law, or zero if
the ﬁrm had fewer than 2,000 workers and
was not affected.  The results suggest that
equal representation caused an 18 percent
decrease in share prices.  In other words,
shareholders are willing to give up around
22 percent of the current value of their
pre-legislation investment to abrogate the
Codetermination Law of 1976.  This will-
18Kraft (1989) reviews earlier
work that was ﬂawed by unreli-
able datasets and inappropriate
empirical methods.
19If ß is the regression coefﬁcient
in a semi-logarithmic model,
then the percentage change of
the dependent variable as a
result of a switch of the dummy
variable from zero to one 
is given by 100(eß–1)
(Halvorsen and Palmquist,
1980).  Using the regression
coefﬁcients displayed in Table 2
of FitzRoy and Kraft (1993),
the 19.7 percent reduction in





FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
38ingness to pay can be viewed as the market
price of the loss of control rights suffered
by shareholders.
Why Does Codetermination Affect Firm
Performance?  Whereas Schmid and Seger
(1998) estimated only how codetermina-
tion affected the market value of corporate
control, Gorton and Schmid (1998a)
investigated the underlying causes and
ultimate consequences of codetermination
in detail.  Using a pooled time-series cross-
section approach covering the 250 largest
traded stock corporations during the 1989-
93 period, the authors conﬁrmed that
equal representation by workers on the
supervisory board was associated with a
negative impact on the ﬁrm’s MTB, ROE,
and ROA.  The market value loss due to
the introduction of equal board representa-
tion by workers was 12.2 percent (a bit
lower than Schmid and Seger’s (1998) 
estimate, which was based on a smaller
sample in different years). 
Gorton and Schmid (1998a) also ana-
lyzed the compensation structures of the
management board and the supervisory
board.  Earlier work by Kaplan (1994) had
suggested that shareholders were just about
as active in controlling German ﬁrms as
they were in the United States.  Comparing
42 German ﬁrms with 146 U.S. and 119
Japanese companies over the period 1981-
89, Kaplan found that ﬁrm performance
and executive turnover were negatively
related in all three countries (i.e., worse
performance is associated with higher
executive turnover).  Building on these
results, Gorton and Schmid showed that
the compensation of both management
board members and supervisory board
members in German ﬁrms is related posi-
tively to ﬁrm performance, just as it is in
the United States.  Furthermore, this pay-
for-performance relationship is robust to
changes in the underlying measure of ﬁrm
performance, encompassing ROA, ROE,
and log of MTB.  Gorton and Schmid 
estimated that a 1 percent increase in
shareholder wealth raises the compensa-
tion of the management board by about
0.05 percent.20
The positive link between ﬁrm perfor-
mance and supervisory board compensation
documented by Gorton and Schmid (1998a)
is surprising because only a few German
ﬁrms apply explicit performance-related
compensation schemes for non-executive
directors.  As it turns out, however,  compen-
sation appears to be implicitly performance-
based.  Gorton and Schmid also found that
the compensation scheme varies  with the
codetermination regime that applies to the
ﬁrm.  The pay of non-executive directors is
more sensitive to ﬁrm performance when
workers have equal board representation
than when only one-third of the board is
made up of worker representatives.  Thus, it
appears that shareholders  provide stronger
incentives for board members to act in
shareholders’ interests when workers are
more heavily represented.  Gorton and
Schmid found that the pay of supervisory
board members rises by 0.19 percent with
a 1 percent increase in shareholder wealth
when workers have less than equal repre-
sentation, while the pay-for-performance
elasticity is 0.34 when workers control
one-half of the supervisory board seats.
CONCLUSION
The corporate governance systems in
Germany and the United States entail both
similarities and differences.  Frequent
changes in control over corporations or
individual divisions have occurred in Ger-
many, averaging some 1,500 per year since
the late 1980s (Bundeskartellamt, 1997).
Likewise, control changes are a frequent
occurrence in the United States, with some
35,000 merger and acquisition events
taking place during the 1976-90 period
(Jensen, 1993, p. 837).
However, the predominant methods by
which control changes take place appear to
differ in the two countries.  Stock-market-
based control changes are frequent and
sometimes contentious in the United
States, while other forms of corporate con-
trol appear to operate in Germany.  Large
blockholders exist in the vast majority of
German ﬁrms, exerting strong control over
the management.  Sales of large blocks of
20These ﬁndings are not directly
comparable to the U.S. results
presented by Jensen and
Murphy (1990), because
Jensen and Murphy used “ﬁrst
differences”  instead of loga-
rithmic values in their regres-
sions.  They found that CEO
compensation changes by
$3.25 for every $1,000
change in shareholder wealth.
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seldom carried out directly through the
stock market.  Universal banks are often
able to exercise control in ﬁrms with dis-
persed ownership—that is, when no other
blockholder exists, universal banks exploit
the proxy voting authority granted to them
by small shareholders.    
Two distinctive features of the German
corporate governance system are universal
banking and codetermination.  These insti-
tutional features are important for under-
standing the German system because they
inﬂuence the ability of shareholders to
exert control over the management of the
ﬁrms they own.  Relatively little empirical
evidence is available for evaluating the
effects of these institutions.
It is beyond the scope of this article 
to determine whether either the German
or U.S. system of corporate governance is
superior in any sense.  Control changes
brought about on stock markets or in the
course of ﬁnancial restructuring, as are
common in the United States, appear to
generate value for shareholders.  For
example, Jensen (1993, p. 837) estimates
that shareholders in ﬁrms acquired over
the period 1976-90 received gains of 
$750 billion (expressed in terms of inﬂa-
tion-adjusted 1992 dollars).  However,
these control changes may have been
costly for other “stakeholders” in the
affected ﬁrms, including employees, 
communities, and bondholders (Shleifer
and Summers, 1988).
More relevant to the German case,
Jensen (1993, pp. 833-34) points out that
the high level of activity in U.S. takeover
markets—a mechanism for exercising cor-
porate control that is external  to the ﬁrm—
is evidence that internal  control mechanisms
have failed.  The German corporate gover-
nance system is oriented more toward
internal than external mechanisms.  Large
blockholders and universal banks are cen-
tral to the functioning of internal control
mechanisms.  Thus, the lack of stock-
market-based takeover activity in Germany
relative to the United States does not 
constitute evidence for or against either
governance system.  More research is
needed to illuminate the underlying
strengths and weaknesses of both systems
of corporate governance.
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